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Introduction
In sub-Saharan Africa the literature states that there is little response in risky sexual behavior due to HIV epidemics (Stoneburner/Low-Beer 2004; Bloom et al. 2000; Williams et al. 2003) . However, response in risky behavior is heterogeneous among individuals based on their socio-economic characteristics like education of women (De Walque 2007; Dupas 2009 ), future life expectancies and expected revenues (Oster 2012) . The most prevalent prevention policy in Africa is the anti-HIV education labeled ABC: Abstain, Be faithful and use Condom. ABC policy has proven to be effective in Uganda and it's being extended to other sub-Saharan countries without, up to now, any clear evidence of success (Green et al. 2006; Oster 2007) .
1 Nowadays, risky sexual behavior is one of the major focuses of HIV prevention policies. Understanding changes or its characteristic is an important base for predicting the future path of the epidemic and the pattern of its prevalence. Based on raw data, the spread of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa is heterogeneous among regions. One reason is the presence of other untreated and sexually transmitted diseases that favor HIV infection (Oster 2005) . 2 Another reason is the circumcision of men that 1 Studies have given alternative explanation for why ABC was claimed to be effective in Uganda. Routes of exports might have an important role rather than just population based educational campaign. 2 The high rate of HIV transmission in Africa is due to other untreated sexually transmitted diseases (STD) . The difference in the transmission rates is large enough to explain the observed difference in prevalence between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa.
reduces sexually transmitted diseases (Weiss et al. 2000) . Local economic development also plays its role on HIV infection, as emphasized in Oster (2007) . Under the assumption that risky sexual behavior is a normal good, economic development, like for example exportation, has an important role on individuals' HIV status. In contrast to large number of studies examining individual-level characteristics and determinants of infection, few studies examine community level characteristics and networks that affect individual's behavior and hence HIV epidemics. This research contributes in analyzing the diverse rate of HIV prevalence across and within countries and gives insights in understanding the role of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on risky sexual behavior. Heterogeneity, in terms of ethnicity, race and religion, on social capital and, consequently, on economic variables has been discussed in the literature. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) found that ethnic, racial and economic heterogeneity have a negative impact on social capital and consequently on economic development in the USA. It is generally associated with lower trust among communities because members of the community have different taste, making it harder to enforce a system of social sanctions. In these communities, it is more likely that informal social networks and community organizations are weak leaving less-or-unsanctioned socially deviating behaviors. Pongou (2011) developed a theory to explain how community-level ethnic heterogeneity determines the formation of sexual networks among couples, and how this, in turn, affects the spread of HIV/AIDS. In the model, agents derive utility from sexual relationships and infidelity is punished if detected by own partner. When information circulates more easily within ethnic groups than across, agents tend to choose their extramarital partners from different groups to hide their infidelity, due to cross-group anonymity. The paper extends the finding of Pongou (2011) by underlining the role of gender-gap. Women better internalize ethno-linguistic heterogeneity when optimizing the number of extramarital partners. In a set-up where individuals gain non-material and material benefits from engaging in extramarital sex, the cost of being sanctioned due to detection is augmented by the material gain (loss) from that partner. With respect to Pongou (2011) , in a pro-male economy, where women enjoy more benefits from their sexual partners, the findings suggest that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity shapes more women's behavior rather than men's (Swilder et al. 2007) . 3 The study gives further evidence of this relationship by extending the analysis on couples' data-set and concordance of their HIV status. The study is based on the Demographic and Health Survey data-sets (DHS) that gives the possibility to link the HIV status of an individual with her ethnic characteristic. The analysis gives evidence for four sub-Saharan countries: Malawi, Cameroon, Kenya and Ethiopia in order of HIV prevalence. The choice of these countries is based on data availability on ethnicity, territorial comparability and relevant HIV prevalence. With respect to Pongou (2011) I exclude Burkina Faso and Ghana for territorial comparability and also because HIV prevalence is very low in these two countries. The period of the survey ranges between 2003 and 2005. The paper uses an indicator of heterogeneity that is widely used in the literature: the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index based on the Herfindahl index. Consistency of the hypothesis tested is verified on other indicators of heterogeneity: the Generalized Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (GELF), based on a similarity matrix of ethnicity among couples and the Entropy index (EI) which is an indicator of diversity. These indicators differ for the degree of interaction between the ethnicities. The ELF gives more weight to individuals with higher proportion in the population. The GELF takes into account some aspects of similarity between the groups. The Entropy index, on the contrary, gives more weight to the number of ethnicities in the community. The results suggest that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity matters more on HIV status of women rather than men and this finding is not driven by the biological exposure of women to HIV infection. Notwithstanding, I further analyze the data-set of couples together with their HIV status. I show the role of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on discordant couples married for more than 5 years. I find a positive relationship between the indicator and the probability of being in a discordant couple where she is positive and the husband is negative. On the reverse, I do not find any effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on discordant couples where he is HIV positive. This finding suggests that the effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is gender related. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an outline of the framework that lies behind the mechanism; Section 3 derives some comparative statics to be tested and Section 4 illustrates the empirical strategy and results. A sensitivity analysis is conducted in Section 6 and finally, some conclusions are laid off in Section 7.
Conceptual framework
Ethnic fractionalization has an important role in the political economy of many countries as it leads to political instability, poor quality of institutions, badly designed economic policy and poor economic performance. Several studies have shown the negative relationship between racial or ethnic heterogeneity and the provision of public goods (Alesina et al. 1999; Miguel/Gugerty 2005a) while others focused on the impact on productivity (Bandiera et al. 2005; Alesina/La Ferrara 2005) . A comparison across US counties showed that higher ethnic fractionalization is associated with a lower rate of collective action in the community, lower trust and participation (Vigdor 2004; Alesina/La Ferrara 2000) . The role of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on low public expenditures and provision of public goods has an implication on HIV/AIDS. In fragmented societies, governments are less likely to provide anti-HIV policies because of lower civil society and collective action as argued in Lieberman (2007) . Measuring, and thus defining, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in sub-Saharan countries is challenging. The traditional measure based on the Herfindahl index, conventionally called Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), is given by the probability of two randomly drawn individuals from the population belong to two different groups. If I consider a community composed of more than two different ethnic groups, with s i being the share of group i over the total at community level and n being the total number of ethnicity, then the ELF index would be:
It varies between 0-1 and an increase in the indicator means more heterogeneous society. The ELF assumes that language and ethnicity map one-to-one and both have similar con-sequences on individuals' networking and social sanctions. Social heterogeneity is endogenous to many unobservables at community level. It is continuously in motion and difficult to define across different cultural, time and space boundaries. For example, continuous regional migration and inter-mixing with other groups suggest that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is a function of local economic development, colonial policy and inter-group mixing (Alesina et al. 2003) . A more detailed critics to indicators of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in Africa have been argued in Posner (2004) . In some societies there are different similarities among different ethnic groups which compose the community. The ELF index gives the same weight to all ethnicity, while in reality some might have similar cultural values which should be taken into account. The ELF index attributes a 0 or 1 value to individuals in the community depending if they belong or not to an ethnicity or race. On the reverse, the GLF index has been proposed in Bossert et al. (2008) where each individual is weighted by similarity values. Similarity measurement can be based on income, education, language and etc. To compute the indicator of similarity, I use the matching of ethnicities from the data-set of couples. The reasoning behind is if a high proportion of people from ethnicity ''x" get married to another ethnicity ''y" then similarity between these two ethnicities is non zero in terms of cultural values and networks. To compute similarities between two ethnicities, I take the average of four frequencies: frequency of wife from ethnicity ''x" getting married to husband from ethnicity ''y"; frequency of wife from ethnicity ''y" getting married to husband from ethnicity ''x"; and similarly for the husband. To give you an illustration on the indicator I construct, I consider a community with three ethnicities. The similarity matrix S of couples' matching, based on the ethnicity of the husband and wife, is as follows: x;y denotes the proportion of husbands x getting married to women of y (script h stands for husband while w for wife). The matrix is symmetric and equal to 1 on the diagonals as similarity with own ethnicity is 1. I construct a similarity matrix as above for each enumeration area in the data-set. Based on the above matrix, S, the Generalized Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (GELF) indicator, as proposed in Bossart et al. (2008) , is as follows:
where i; jE x; y; z f gand s i;j is an element of the matrix S. Another index of diversity computed is the Entropy Index (EI), also known as the Shannon index, used for species to measure biodiversity. The ELF index gives higher weights to higher proportion of ethnicities as it has a quadratic form, while the EI gives a decreasing weight as the proportion of a specific ethnicity increases in a community. It takes a maximum value when all the ethnicities are equally represented in the community. I compute a normalized EI, between [0,1], in each enumeration area:
where s i is the proportion of ethnic i in the community, n is the number of ethnicities in the community and N is the total number of individuals in the community.
The above indicators are computed on ethnicities in each enumeration area by exploiting data at individual level. There are a total of 50 ethnicities in Cameroon, 67 in Ethiopia, 15 in Kenya and 9 in Malawi. The correlation between the three indicators I computed is 0.79 between ELF and GELF, 0.94 between ELF and EI and 0.75 between GELF and EI.
Theoretical model and comparative statics
In this section, I extend the basic fidelity model developed by Pongou (2011) where a community is assumed to be composed of e ethnic groups G 1 ; :::; G h ; G l ; :::; G e . Each group has a distinct language and culture, which makes social interactions easier and more intense within groups than across. It focuses on an individual's decision-making of sexual partners. The utility function of an agent i in choosing sexual partners is the following:
where s is the total number of sexual partners allocated across ethnic groups, that in algebric form is equal to s ¼ P e h¼1 s h . The model differs from Pongou (2011) because I assume that the representative agent's utility function also depends on y, that is the total amount of material benefit deriving from having sex with the s partners, for simplicity expressed in terms of income. In a pro-male biased economy y can also represent social status, other than income or material benefit. As in Pongou (2011) , c represents the reputational cost due to detection and it is a function of both s and y. In a nutshell, if agent i has a liaison with partner j belonging to ethnic group G l she yields y l . Therefore, the total amount of income y is determined according to the vector y 1 ; . . . ; y h ; . . . ; y e ð Þ associated to the vector s 1 ; . . . ; s h ; . . . ; s e ð Þ of her sexual partners; thus, in algebraic terms, it corresponds to y ¼ P e h¼1 s h y h . The basic assumption relies on the fact that yielded income does not vary within ethnic groups, but only across groups. The rationale of this hypothesis lies on the focus that is strictly addressed on investigating the relation between ethnic groups and sexual behavior. By the same token, as described below, the cost of infidelity is going to depend upon both sexual partners and income.
Let j and k be two sexual partners of agent i. The event that j detects the liaison between i and k has the probability p to occur if j and k belong to the same ethnic group, while the probability q is associated when j and k belong to different ethnic groups. As in Pongou (2011) , it is straightforwardly assumed that q < p.
Notwithstanding, the cost of infidelity is not constant for each sexual partner. Particularly, assume that i has s partners allocated across groups according to the vector 
, which is the total expected number of liaisons that s sexual partners of i will detect. The punishment cost is modeled differently from Pongou (2011) because it allows for a group-variant loss of income per detection. I am interested in evaluating how the fidelity model is affected by different punishment costs varying across groups according to a vector y ¼ y 1 ; . . . ; y h ; . . . ; y e ð Þ .
In other terms, if a partner j belonging to ethnic group G h detects a liaisons between i and k, the punishment cost is equal to y h . Hence, I assume that the punishment cost corresponds to the income that agent i would yield from having each sexual partner. Consequently, y h must be viewed as a benefit if there are no detections, but it becomes a loss in case of detection. The cost function can be written in the following way:
where c is the reputational cost per detection, as in Pongou (2011) . By considering linear utility function, the optimization problem of agent i is divided into two steps. 1. First, the total amount of sexual partners s is considered fixed and the agent must decide how to allocate sexual partners across the ethnic groups in order to maximize her expected utility. 2. Second, given the optimal allocation of sexual partners in the vector s across different ethnicities, she derives the optimal amount of sexual partner s
Optimal allocation of partners across ethnic groups
The first step of agent's maximization problem can be written as follows:
In the first step, the agent's maximization problem determines s Ã h that is the optimal allocation of sexual partners across ethnicities. In a second step, the agent will define the total amount of partners s which is a vector of the optimal allocation of partners across ethnicities, s ¼ s
By substituting the constraint in the expected utility and after some algebra, it yields the following first order condition:
By putting P h s h y h ¼ y I can easily derive that
However, y depends on s h as well. I denote y Àh the total gains from all groups except those yielded from sexual partners s h belonging to the ethnic group G h . In the same vein, s Àh is the total amount of sexual partners except those belonging to the ethnic group G h . It is straightforward that y Àh arises when partner j belonging to ethnic groups G Àh is expected to detect liaisons of i with other sexual partners. Thus, I can rewrite optimal s h in the following way after some algebra:
The optimal solution of s h can be divided in two factors. The first factor does not depend on material gain. The second factor accounts both for overall punishment cost due to the sanctions carried out by sexual partners of the ethnic groups G Àh { i. e. q y Àh þ cs Àh ð Þ } and for net marginal cost in terms of sexual utility and cost of reputation (1 À c). Note that c > 1 because it is reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of sexual encounter in case of full detection is greater than the marginal utility.
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The following marginal derivative is useful to ascertain the relation between y h and s h .
where
Optimal number of sexual partners
Given the optimal allocation in the vector s Ã , the second step consists in deriving the optimal amount of sexual partners. Hence, I rewrite s h as a function of s; after some algebra, it yields the following expression:
where y y is the expected value Eðy h Þ and r s;y is the covariance between s h and y h . 6 If I assume y 1 ¼ . . . y h ¼ . . . y e f g , and thus y h ¼ y y and r s;y ¼ 0, the solution collapses to the Pongou (2011)'s result, s Ã h ¼ s e , i. e. sexual partners are equally allocated across ethnic groups. The second step is the following optimization problem:
5 This condition avoids an equilibrium where individuals choose positive number of sexual partners even when the probability of detection is one. 6 By substituting P h s h y h ¼ y in the first order condition, I can replace
in (13). I get s h as a function of s by taking into account that y ¼ e sy ð Þ ¼ sy þ er s;y , where sy ð Þ is the expected value E s h y h ½ , y y is the expected value of Eðy h Þ, and r s;y is the covariance.
The following first order condition is derived:
qs . Some calculations yield:
Differently from Pongou (2011) the optimal amount of sexual partners s Ã depends on y y, that is due to the presence of w y ð Þ in the expected utility. It is also positively related to high-income ethnic groups with respect to the mean. By assuming y 1 ¼ . . . y h ¼ . . . y e ¼ y y, it is possible to simplify the optimal solution (16) in the following compact formula:
Again, by holding y y ¼ 0 the optimal solution collapses to Pongou (2011)'s. It corresponds to the case of equal distribution of income over each ethnic group. In order to cope with comparative statics, it is worth stressing the following propositions that come from solving the first derivatives. Throughout the paper I will refer to these relations.
Proposition 1.
In fact, Pongou (2011) , the positive partial derivative of s Ã with respect to e implies that if the number of ethnic groups is high then individuals tend to increase their number of sexual partners.
In fact, the following holds:
The following expression is derived from: i)
The negative partial derivative of s Ã with respect to c suggests that the higher the reputational cost the lower the number of sexual partners individuals will choose. However, the rationale is different when the derivative with respect to y is explored. The positive partial derivative in y shows that as the material benefit increases, being all else equal, individuals tend to increase the number of sexual partners. Moreover, the second derivatives show that the reaction to heterogeneity is decreasing in c and increasing in y.
Proposition 3. I define s Ã male when y y is equal to zero and punishment is only due to reputational cost. I hypothesize that men do not have economic gains or loss from sexual partners.
8 Accordingly, comparing male and female is equivalent to collapsing y y to zero, in which case it coincides with Pongou (2011) , where c is the reputational cost. I show that women react more to ethno-linguistic heterogeneity with respect to men by comparing the two derivatives. The proposition is easily derived with respect to e from the following expression:
Proposition 3 shows that women are more affected by heterogeneity than men as women have economic gains and loss other than the non monetary benefits and costs from sexual partners. 9 Throughout the paper, I am going to test if Proposition 3 holds, or, equivalently, if the impact of heterogeneity differ by gender. The DHS survey collects information on population, health, HIV, and nutrition every five years in different countries. Together with the questionnaire, individuals are asked to give a blood spot for HIV test and the results are not communicated to the interviewees. In case individuals are interested, they are given a voucher for HIV test in the nearest hospital. The percentage of individuals who have already been tested for HIV before the DHS survey is very low. There are several advantages of the DHS: it provides the most accurate estimate of HIV prevalence in the population; individuals are not aware of their status allowing for research on the determinants of HIV; each individual's HIV status is linked to their socio-economic characteristics, including their partner. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1 . Both HIV status and extramarital sex (including premarital sex) vary across regions and countries. HIV prevalence is the highest in Malawi compared to other countries. Men declare more extramarital sex than women but they are less likely to be HIV positive with respect to women in all countries considered. This is because women are more biologically exposed to HIV infection with 8 I assume that men do not have extramarital partners from which they have material gains and which they would lose in case of detection. Men might buy sex but in this case they would have material benefit in case of detection. I simplify the model by assuming that men have only non material benefit and reputational costs from detection as in Pongou (2011). 9 After some algebra the following inequality holds: respect to men. Cameroon is the most heterogeneous country in terms of ethnicity followed by Malawi, Kenya and Ethiopia. For ease of interpretation, all indicators of heterogeneity are used in percentage forms throughout the paper. In terms of socioeconomic characteristics, these countries are comparable except for education in Kenya, which is highest. Measuring risky sexual behavior, or number of sexual partners, based on self-reported information suffers from under/over reporting. It depends on socio-economic characteristic of the respondent, the way the questionnaire was administered and on the interviewers. Many studies have underlined how self-reported variables on sexual behavior result inconsistent when information is matched with biological features like sexually transmitted diseases. The majority of recent studies complement self-reported sexual behaviors with other sexually transmitted diseases. For proving the hypothesis in Proposition 3, I conduct the analysis on HIV status of individuals as it is an objective measurement of risky sexual behavior. In Africa, HIV prevalence among adults is mainly driven by heterosexual sex and it has been found that unsafe injections or inefficient health care system cannot explain the patterns of the epidemics (Schmid et al. 2004 ).
To account for the different biological exposure of men and women to HIV, the regressions include controls for gender in the pooled analysis and in some cases regressions are run on different samples by gender. As a further robustness checks, I also show that poisson regressions on the number of extra-and-premarital sex in the last 12 months is positively associated to ethnolinguistic heterogeneity.
The impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on HIV Status
HIV prevalence rate ranges between 1.3 % in Ethiopia and 12.3 % in Malawi. 10 It is higher among women (1.7 % in Ethiopia and 13.9 % in Malawi) rather than men and in urban areas rather than in rural areas. I test if HIV status of men and women is a function of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. I estimate the following equation based on the probability of being HIV positive:
where HIV i;c is HIV status of individual i in community c, H c is ethno-linguistic or religious heterogeneity in the community, X i;c is a set of individual control variables in community c and D r is a set of dummies at regional level. Location in urban/rural areas, education and wealth might be, to some extent, choice variables for the individual or her family. Individuals migrate, due to their HIV status or antiretroviral treatment, in more heterogeneous areas. For-example, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity might give an opportunity to HIV positive individuals to keep confidentiality on their status and use strategic behavior with their partner in order not to infect him. Notwithstanding, it implies that she is aware of her status, which is often not the case in the DHS. Hence, individuals do not self-select to heterogeneous societies due to their HIV status. All the regressions are run on a sample of communities with baseline density and 70 % of the people sampled in the community being residing for at least 10 years. 11 The restricted sample is, hopefully, representative of areas that are less subject to inflow of migration like commercial areas that are characterized by a higher demand for sex. The restriction on the sample does not, however, rule out areas which are subject to out-flow of seasonal migration, but this does not affect the main conclusion of the paper. 12 The regressions further control for migration where I define migrant a person who is residing in the place of residence for less than 10 years.
For illustrative purpose and comparison with the results in Pongou (2011), I report the OLS coefficients of ELF on HIV status and prevalence at enumeration area level in Table 2 . A one percent increase in ethno-linguistic heterogeneity increases the probability of being HIV positive by almost 0.06 %. These coefficients are very similar to results found in Pongou (2011) , where the indicators of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity varied between 0-1. Alternatively, it increases HIV prevalence rate at enumeration area level by around 5 %. I report results only on ELF for ease of comparison with Pongou (2011) . The table also shows that the coefficients on ELF are not driven by omitted variables like religious heterogeneity and ethnic specific characteristics. Indeed the parameters are robust to the inclusion of these variables in the regressions as shown in Table 2 . Table 3 reports OLS regressions by differentiating the effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity based on gender. The results show the gender related effect and how heterogeneity shapes more the behavior of women and their HIV status. All the indicators have a positive effect on HIV status of women. I find no effect of heterogeneity on HIV status of 12 The DHS is a population based survey where randomly selected households are interviewed. As household members of seasonal migrants are less likely to move with the individual, it is likely that they do not affect the indicators of heterogeneity. These are often rural areas and likely to be homogenous. Thus, the restriction of the sample to non-migrant individuals will imply a downward bias and does not affect the main findings. men. Results in Column (1) are based on the ELF, while Column (2) reports the Generalized Index and Column (3) shows the Entropy index. I further extend my analysis on the role of women's HIV status in married couples. Nevertheless, as the main focus of the analysis is the role of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on HIV, I will mainly focus on ELF in the rest of the paper. The other indicators are reported for the sake of robustness and completeness. Table 4 further reports subsamples of women and men based on their marital status. In Column (1), I show results from the pooled sample; Column (2) restricts the sample to enumeration areas where the number of people sampled is superior to ten and the proportion of migrants is less than 30 %. From Column (2) to (7), the sample is restricted by gender and marital status. The sub-samples do not sum to the total number of men and women as I exclude those who are divorced, widowed or married but not living together at the time of the survey. Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity has a positive impact on HIV status of women, especially on those who were married or cohabiting at the time of the survey, while the same result cannot be concluded for men and their marital status.
Even though HIV status is a reliable information compared to self-reported variables, it is based on voluntary testing. Individuals can refuse to be tested and the average response rate is higher for women rather than for men. It is also higher in rural areas rather than Note: All regressions include 34 regional fixed effects, dummies for wealth and education. The sample is restricted to those areas where the number of people sampled in the enumeration area is superior to 10 and the proportion of migrants in the enumeration area is less than 30 %. Results are stronger if I relax this restriction. In all regressions, samples weights are used and robust standard errors clustered at the enumeration area level. *** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1 Note: All regressions include regional fixed effects, religious heterogeneity, religion, wealth, education, age and if rural or urban area. Results hold even if I include ethnic fixed effects and other socioeconomic characteristics. From column 2, the sample is restricted to those areas where the number of people sampled in an enumeration area is superior to 10 and 70 % of the people sampled in a give Community are residents for more than 10 years. Column 2 is based on the sample of all eligible women while column 3 and 4 are respectively Married and Unmarried women. I replicate similar analysis on men from column 5 to 7. *** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1 urban areas. Overall response rate is more than 70 %. Mean differences of observable characteristics between women who accepted and refused to test show that women who refused are more likely to be HIV positive (Juhn et al. 2009 ) underestimating HIV. 13 Non response will be explicitly dealt with in the last section of the paper.
Discordant couples and ethno-linguistic fractionalization
To better understand the difference between serostatus of men and women and if infection occurred due to own behavior or that of partner's, in this section, I focus on couples which are HIV concordant or discordant.
In the data-set of couples I consider cases where HIV is discordant, i. e. either the wife or the husband is seropositive. Out of 7,171 couples interviewed with information on their serostatus, 5.5 % of them are in a discordant couple. There are a total of 424 women and 411 men who are HIV positive with married or cohabiting marital status. Discordance among couples might occur due to risky behavior before or after marriage. It also depends if the couple is polygamous. Approximately, all HIV positive married women and men are equally divided among concordant and discordant status. By restricting the sample to couples married for a determined period of time, ten years, HIV discordant cases are good proxies for effective extramarital sex. By effective extramarital, I refer to HIV infection that occurred with sexual encounter outside wedlock, given the partner is HIV negative.
In Table 5 I show results on discordant couples. I first consider the impact of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on the probability of being in a discordant couple (Column (1) and (2)). Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is positively associated with the probability of being in a discordant couple and it approximately measures effective risky behavior of both the husband and wife given a certain period of time the couple is married. The effect on discordance is then split by wife's or husband's serostatus on a sample of couples who are married or cohabiting for at least five years. There is a positive effect of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on the probability of being in a discordant couple. The effect is stronger for discordant couples when the wife is HIV positive as shown in Column (3) and (4). The proportion of men and women who are in a discordant status are comparable. The excluded categories are concordant couples and discordant couples when the husband is HIV positive. The analysis on men is presented in Column (5) and (6). Table 5 shows that, in areas with high values of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, HIV positive women are more likely to be in a discordant couple with infection more likely to have occurred after marriage. Even though women are biologically exposed to HIV, the restriction of the sample to a minimum of five year marriage allows to infer that their infection occurred with extramarital relation.
14 Column (3) and (4) highlights the main result on the role of gender and it distinguishes the paper from previous results presented in Pongou (2011) ; it shows that women are more likely to be infected with HIV from out-of-wedlock sexual relation in heterogeneous areas, while the same does not hold for men's infection. 13 Individuals who refuse to test are more likely to be educated, less likely to live in rural areas and more likely to be in the wealthiest quintile (Juhn et al. 2009 ). This is a similar pattern which separates HIV positive and HIV negative women. 14 The conclusion is based on the assumption that the main channel of HIV infection is heterosexual sex.
6 Sensitivity analysis
The effect of ELF on risky sexual behavior
There are numerous factors that influence individual's risky sexual behavior: general individual characteristics (age, education, wealth, marital status, health), social characteristics (communities' ethnic or religious identities), knowledge and exposure to HIV/ AIDS and cost of HIV infection and prevention. In the sample, 17 % of the individuals declared at least one extramarital sex in the last twelve months with relevant heterogeneity among countries. Out of the total number of men sampled, 25 % declared at least one extramarital sex versus 11 % of women, showing that women reported less risky behavior than men.
I test the mechanism through which ethno-linguistic heterogeneity impacts HIV status by evaluating the impact of the indicators on risky behavior according to the following reduced form:
where s i;c is the number of declared extramarital relations of individual i in community c. Table 6 reports results based on poisson regression of declared extramarital sex on heterogeneity and other control variables. (1) and (2) if the couple is concordant: both positive or negative. From Column (3)-(6) the sample is restricted to couples with at least 5 years of marital duration. In Column (3) and (4) it takes the value one whenever she is positive and he is negative. Finally in column (5) and (6) it takes the value one whenever he is positive and she negative. In all regressions, sample weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. Regional FE refer to administrative areas within countries. *** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1 Table 6 Extramarital Sex and Ethno-linguistic Heterogeneity In Column (2), I restrict the sample to eligible women while in (3) and (4) I distinguish between married and unmarried. The same type of analysis is extended to men from Column (5)- (7). In all regressions, sample weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. *** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1
As in the above analysis, there is a positive and significant impact of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on the number of declared extramarital relation (Column (1)). 15 Married women report higher number of extramarital sex in more heterogeneous societies (Column (3)). Similarly, married men also report higher number of sexual partners in heterogeneous societies, but the magnitude is much lower (Column (6)). The regressions on declared risky behavior are to be taken with caution as many studies have underlined self-reported variables on private information not to be truthfully reported (Gersovitz et al. 1998; Glynn et al. 2001) . For example, Glynn et al. (2001) showed that 12 % of women who reported being virgins were HIV positive and some had other sexually transmitted infections. The number of extramarital sex, declared by both married and cohabiting individuals is inconsistent with their recent sexual activity in the last four weeks. I use the data on monogamous couples where information on their sexual activity in the last four weeks and number of extramarital sex in the last twelve months is available both for the husband and wife. There are a total of 7,698 couples interviewed. In 1,046 cases, the declaration of sexual activity is discordant, i.e. husband declares to have been sexually active in the last four weeks while the woman not. Indeed, in a monogamous couple, if one partner declares not to be active in the last four weeks while the other declares so, then the latter should be more likely to declare at least one extramarital sex in the last twelve months. Out of 513 cases, where the wife was sexually active and the husband not, 99 % of the women declared zero extramarital sex in the last twelve months. Extramarital sex is under-reported for men as well: only 17.5 % of them declare at least one extramarital sex, even if they have been active in the last four weeks while their wife not. It is interesting to note that the discordance in recent sexual activity is, approximately, equally distributed among men and women (533 versus 513). This means that they were either negligent in reporting recent sexual activity leading to inconsistency or husband and wife under-report extramarital sex. One should correct for under/over reporting of extramarital sex with good instruments that predict reporting but not correlated with sexual behavior. It is however difficult to find variables with reliable exclusion restriction on reported extramarital sex. For this reason, I focus on the relationship between HIV prevalence and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity as HIV epidemics in Africa is known to be driven by heterosexual relations.
Public good provision
Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and public goods provision has been discussed in the literature through its role on conflicts, different preferences and tastes (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2000; Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina et al. 2005) . In these studies, a possible mechanism, through which ethno-linguistic heterogeneity affects HIV status, might be due to public policies or public good provision at community or regional level. In light of this, the regional and rural/urban dummies should capture any difference in the provision of public policies related to HIV/AIDS epidemics at regional and urban/rural level due to public expenditure. Moreover, a common characteristic of African countries is the role played by policy makers in enhancing regional and ethnic favoritism in the allocation of governmental funds or public good provision, as emphasized in Lieberman (2007) . I argue that the dummies capture potential bias due to ethnic favoritism in addressing government funds against HIV at regional level. Moreover, results do not change when replicated with ethnic fixed effects.
Compliance in HIV test
Compliance in the dataset varies across countries, urban/rural areas and gender. Compliance is approximately 4.4 % in Cameroon, 14.4 in Ethiopia, 18.5 % in Kenya and 23.9 % in Malawi. Different levels of response rates might over/underestimate HIV prevalence and also bias the parameter of interest if compliance is correlated with ethnolinguistic heterogeneity. In Figure 1-3, I show the correlation between these variables. On the vertical axis of Figure 1 is the quintile distribution of HIV prevalence at enumeration area level while in Figure 2 and Figure 3 is the quartile distribution of the ELF. They are all positively correlated implying a bias in the estimator. HIV prevalence, refusal and prior testing rates are correlated and socio-economic characteristics that predict HIV status are more likely to predict non compliance. For example, in Malawi, HIV positive individuals who know their status are almost five times more likely to refuse testing than HIV negative individuals (Eaton et al. 2009 ). In Table 7a and 7b, I present mean differences between compliers and non. The ELF is statistically different among the two groups. Those who do not comply for an HIV test are more likely to be richer, educated and never married. They are also more likely to be migrants and live in urban areas where on average ELF is higher. In terms of risky sexual behavior, non compliers report less risky behavior and claim to have been tested for HIV. The bias of the parameters is sever to the extent non compliance is large or if compliance predicts the probability of being HIV positive and, finally, to the extent compliance is correlated with ELF. To measure the severity of the bias, I replicate my results in areas with different levels of compliance: total compliance, above and below the median compliance rate. Table 8 shows the sign and significance of the parameters in all the samples. In the first two columns, I report results on the pooled for comparison reasons. In Column (3) and (4), I restrict the sample to those enumeration areas where there is complete response rate. The magnitude of the parameter decreases, but the sign and significance persist. In Column (5) and (6), I present results on the sample of individuals who live in enumeration areas with compliance above the median, while in Column (7) and (8), I present results with compliance below the median. The main difference between Column (4), (6) and (8) is the increasing number of compliance. The magnitude of the coefficient increases with the increasing number of compliance. I add controls that are likely to predict compliance and HIV status like wealth, education and migration, as shown in Table 7a and 7b. Compliance might still be an issue, but the effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is not totally driven by sample selection as the coefficient on ELF persist in all the regressions, as shown in Table 8 . Moreover, compliance is more likely to occur in areas where HIV prevalence is high, implying a probable downward bias in HIV prevalence.
Migration and possible other threats to internal validity
The results might be driven by inflow of migration in a way that the presence of migrants in an area might affect ethno-linguistic heterogeneity; at the same time migrants might practice high risk sexual activity with respect to non migrants. To this purpose I also restricted, throughout the paper, the sample to areas where 80 % of the people sampled are residents for at least 10 years. Ten years is the maximum number, which allows to Notes: The above two tables provide socio-economic difference between compliers and non. Table 7 (a) reports the main variables of interest in terms of risky sexual behavior, community level heterogeneity, gender and migration. These differences are also reflected in general socio-economic characteristics like education, income and marital differences as reported in Table 7 (b).
identify those who have contracted the virus in their actual place of residence. Unfortunately, data do not allow to control for seasonal migration. Nevertheless, seasonal migration is characteristic of rural areas and it would be a downward bias. It is still possible that the relationship between ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and HIV is not causal. For instance, community level income inequality is one possible omitted variable that might be driving both risky sexual behavior and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Unfortunately, detail information on income distribution of households that is comparable across countries is not available in the DHS.
Conclusions
This paper uses the most recent nationally representative survey of four sub-Saharan countries, spatially comparable, to determine the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on HIV epidemics. It has been found that social heterogeneity plays a positive role on extramarital sex as it is characterized by lower social cohesion and networks. As such, individuals can optimally allocate partners across different networks and groups without being detected (Pongou 2011) . This study puts forward this literature by showing the higher return for women from optimal allocation of partners. The theoretical derivation shows that individuals who have higher material benefits/losses from sexual partners are more elastic to social heterogeneity. Indeed, with respect to men, patterns of social heterogeneity are positively associated with HIV status of women and their declared extramarital sex. The study puts forward an original result by emphasizing the probability of being detected from deviating behaviors and the discrepancy in the sanction attributed to extramarital sex. HIV status of women and the probability of being in a discordant couple where she is HIV positive is positively associated with social heterogeneity. The finding on discordant couples disentangles the effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on own status due to own sexual behavior rather than that of partner's. Women are more likely to engage in risky sexual behavior in heterogeneous societies where detection from their partners is less likely to occur. As a further support for the hypothesis tested is the positive association between declared extramarital sex of women and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. The paper contributes in underlining community level characteristics that shape individual's risky behavior necessary to address some specific prevention policies. Mostly, the analysis contributes to better understand the gender biased behavior in extramarital sex and its consequence on HIV status. The paper fits into the recent literature in understanding women's sexual behavior and transactional sex in sub-Saharan Africa, where exchanging sex for money, goods, or services is a way of life for many poor women. Finally, the paper also helps to understand the different HIV prevalence across regions, sex and socio-economic characteristics. 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of being HIV positive. In the first column I represent results for the total sample, with and without controls, for ease of comparison. In Column (3) and (4), I present results for areas where the percentage of compliers were 100 % at enumeration area level. For areas where non response was above zero,I split the sample into 2: above or below the median value of non response rate. The median value was 15.8 %. In Column (5) and (6), I present results where response rate was above 15.8 while in Column (7) and (8) is the reverse. In all regressions, sample weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at enumeration area level. *** p50.01, ** p50.05, * p50.1
